David Lagziel
Associate Professor, Economics
I am a Senior Lecturer with tenure (Associate Professor equiv.) at the Economics Department, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.
I completed my Ph.D. in Mathematics, specializing in Game Theory, under the supervision of Prof. Ehud Lehrer, at the Department of Operations Research and Statistics, Tel Aviv University.
About me
Recent Studies
Joint with Tao Wang and Ehud Lehrer
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations are provided for deterministic and stochastic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, partition refinements, and common knowledge components. This study extends the work of Blackwell (1951) to games, and expands the study of Aumann (1976) on common knowledge by developing a theory of information loops.
Joint with Nathan Goldstein and Ohad Raveh
Attention to political information stands at the core of political theory, yet measuring it is a challenging endeavor. We propose a novel measure of political rational inattention, based on political forecast data. Capitalizing on the unique features of the American National Election Studies, which recurrently collect political forecast data in daily frequency prior to elections, we construct a state-by-year data series of political rational inattention, covering the period 1952-2020 in U.S. presidential election years. Examining key patterns, we show that political and economic attention are complementary, in contrast to limited attention hypotheses. Thereafter, we consider an application of this measure within the context of political polarization. First, we present a rational inattention, persuasion model that illustrates how heightened societal attention may exacerbate political polarization. Second, we empirically test the model’s predictions via detailed individual-data on political opinions, finding that state (societal) political attention fuels political polarization: a standard deviation increase in attention raises the extent of average polarization by 6\%.
Joint with Yan Zhang and Ohad Raveh
Political donations are a cornerstone of political campaigns, yet their impact on the dynamics of electoral contests remains largely unexplored. This study examines the role of campaign contributions in fostering sabotage, particularly through negative campaigning in gubernatorial elections. Using a model of political contests, with endogenous sabotage and asymmetries in candidates’ popularity, we demonstrate that an increase in funding can incentivize candidates to escalate sabotage efforts. We validate this by performing a highly granular merge, at the candidate-date level, of two extensive datasets—political donations and political TV ads—in U.S.\ gubernatorial elections, encompassing approximately $3.5$ million ads from $564$ candidates between $2002$ and $2020$. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variations in state contribution limits and daily precipitation levels, instrumenting donations, we find that political donations translate to negative campaigning within a relatively short timeframe: a one standard deviation increase in the extent of political donations made in the preceding week raises the average campaign negativity by approximately $9\%$. We show that this effect is driven primarily by donations made by individuals, and is strengthened in corrupt, symmetric, and economically weak environments. Our results shed light on hitherto overlooked political externalities of campaign contributions.
Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents
Joint with Eilon Solan and Aditya Aradhye
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. Assuming either anonymity or efficiency, as well as individual rationality, we prove that a non-null incentive-compatible (IC) mechanism does not exist. We characterize the optimal spite-free mechanism showing it is a threshold mechanism with an ordering of the players. Leveraging these findings, we partially extend our analysis to a problem with multiple items and copies. Overall, these results illuminate the challenges of auctioning items in the natural presence of other-regarding preferences.