David Lagziel
Associate Professor, Economics
I am a Senior Lecturer with tenure (Associate Professor equiv.) at the Economics Department, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.
I completed my Ph.D. in Mathematics, specializing in Game Theory, under the supervision of Prof. Ehud Lehrer, at the Department of Operations Research and Statistics, Tel Aviv University.
My research interests lie in the areas of Game Theory and Economic Theory, with a current focus on issues related to public debates, political competitions and information economics.
About me
Recent Studies
Comparison of Oracles
Joint with Tao Wang and Ehud Lehrer
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations are provided for deterministic and stochastic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, partition refinements, and common knowledge components. This study extends the work of Blackwell (1951) to games, and expands the study of Aumann (1976) on common knowledge by developing a theory of information loops.
Resource windfalls, Connectivity, and Political Polarization
Joint with Lotem Ikan and Ohad Raveh - Forthcoming in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
We study the impact of income shocks on political polarization. Previous studies find that polarization increases during economic hardships. We present theory and evidence that point at an opposite perspective, vis-à -vis the case of natural resource windfalls. The latter provide a source of plausibly exogenous income effects that stimulate public debate. Our theoretical framework, based on a contest over public opinion, predicts that heightened exposure to public debates (connectivity) leads to elevated polarization by allowing extremists unbridled control over the discourse. We test the model's predictions by employing detailed individual-level data covering the period 1964-2020, in conjunction with plausibly exogenous differences in natural resource endowments, as well as in connectivity levels, across U.S. states. Our baseline estimates show that a one standard deviation of state resource windfalls increases individuals’ average affective polarization by 4% in high-connectivity states. Our results shed light on the dynamics of polarization, as well as on hitherto overlooked adverse effects of natural resource abundance.
Resource Windfalls and Political Sabotage: Evidence from 5.2 Million Political Ads
Joint with Ohad Raveh and Ehud Lehrer - Forthcoming in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
We study the role of incentives in inducing sabotage in political contents, vis-Ã -vis natural resource windfalls. The latter induce plausibly exogenous increases in contests' stakes, by extending opportunities for policy implementation or private gain upon winning, and enhancing incumbent advantage. A model of political contests with endogenous sabotage indicates that higher stakes increase sabotage in political campaigns. We validate these predictions using over 5 million TV ads from U.S. gubernatorial elections (2010-2020), leveraging plausibly exogenous variations in states' natural resource endowments. Results show that resource windfalls significantly escalate negative campaigning: a standard deviation increase in resource windfalls leads to a 10% rise in campaign negativity. We show that this effect is primarily fueled by corruption, and observed most strongly in symmetric, more-competitive, environments.
Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents
Joint with Eilon Solan and Aditya Aradhye
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. Assuming either anonymity or efficiency, as well as individual rationality, we prove that a non-null incentive-compatible (IC) mechanism does not exist. We characterize the optimal spite-free mechanism showing it is a threshold mechanism with an ordering of the players. Leveraging these findings, we partially extend our analysis to a problem with multiple items and copies. Overall, these results illuminate the challenges of auctioning items in the natural presence of other-regarding preferences.