

CURRICULUM VITAE

• **Personal Details**

Name: David Lagziel

Date and place of birth: November 7, 1983, Israel

Address and telephone number (work): Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU),
Economics Department,
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ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4497-9535

• **Education**

B.Sc. - 2007-2010, Tel Aviv University (TAU), Physics and Mathematics

M.Sc. - 2010-2011, TAU, Mathematics

Name of advisor: Ehud Lehrer

Title of thesis: Regret-free strategies with partial delayed information

Ph.D. - 2012-2017, TAU, Mathematics

Name of advisor: Ehud Lehrer

Title of thesis: Optimal Design of Games in Financial Problems

• **Employment History**

- March 2021 – Present: Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, BGU
- November 2017 – March 2021: Lecturer, Department of Economics, BGU

• **Professional Activities**

(a) Positions in academic administration

2019-present, Head of B.A. teaching committee, Economics, BGU

2018-2019, Economics Research Seminar co-organizer

(b) Professional functions outside universities/institutions

2019, Organizer of the 11th Israeli Game-Theory Conference, BGU

2019, Organizer of the 4th Aumann Lecture, BGU

(c) Significant professional consulting

(d) Editor or member of editorial board of scientific or professional journal

(e) Ad-hoc reviewer for journals

Journal of Economic Theory;

Building and Environment;

Mathematics of Operations Research;

International Journal of Game Theory.

Ad-hoc reviewer for grants

Israel Science Foundation (ISF);

(f) Membership in professional/scientific societies

2019-present, American Economic Association

2016-present, Econometric Society

2014-present, Game-Theory Society

• Educational activities

(a) Courses taught

Statistics A for Economists, B.A., BGU

Statistics B for Economists, B.A., BGU

Calculus for Economists, B.A., BGU

Mathematics for Economists, M.A., BGU

Mathematics for M.A. in Financial Economics, M.A, IDC

(b) Research students

M.A.

1. Bar Dagan, 2019, BGU

2. Chen Yanoos, 2019, BGU

3. Lotem Ikan, 2020, BGU

4. Adi Ostrov, 2020, BGU

5. Aviv Nataf, 2021, BGU

6. Zohar Baruch, 2021, BGU

7. Gili Almagor, 2021, BGU

8. Ron Sade, 2021, BGU

9.

Ph.D.

1. Bar Dagan, 2021, BGU

• **Awards, Citations, Honors, Fellowships**

(a) Honors, Citation Awards

2019, BGU, Galat prize for excellence in teaching

2017, Israeli chapter of the Game-Theory Society, Maschler Prize

2013-2017, TAU, Top 100 junior faculty members (TA) list

2013-2017, TAU, Dean's Award for excellence in teaching

2013, TAU, The Rector's Award for excellence in teaching

2013, TAU, The Ruth and Nathan Eliosef Award (teaching award)

2012, TAU, Award of excellence in M.Sc. studies

(b) Fellowships

2011-2017, TAU, 140,000\$, Graduate school fellowship

• **Scientific Publications**

a) H-index: 2 by ISI; 3 by Google Scholar.

b) Total number of citations of all articles: 6 by ISI; 17 by GS.

c) Total number of citations without self-citations: 4 by ISI; 10 by GS.

(a) Authored books

(b) Editorship of collective volumes

(c) Refereed chapters in collective volumes, Conference proceedings, Festschrifts, etc.

Notes:

Economics publications below list authors in strictly alphabetical order and *not* by relative contribution.

AIS indicates the Article Influence Score, which is superior to IF.

GS indicates raw Google Scholar citations (includes citations by working papers or citations of the working paper version of the cited paper).

(d) Refereed articles and refereed letters in scientific journals

1. **Lagziel**^{PI} D. and E. Lehrer^{PI}. 2015. Approachability with delayed information. *Journal of Economic Theory*. 157:425-444.
Citations: 2 (ISI), 6 (GS);
AIS: 2.19, 45/373 Economics (Q1).
2. ***Lagziel**^{PI} D. and E. Lehrer^{PI}. 2018. Reward schemes. *Games and Economic Behavior*. 107:21-40.
Citations: 2 (ISI), 3 (GS);
AIS: 1.416, 79/373 Economics (Q1).
3. ***Lagziel**^{PI} D. 2019. Credit auctions and bid caps. *Games and Economic Behavior*. 113:416-422.
Citations: 1 (ISI), 3 (GS);
AIS: 1.416, 79/373 Economics (Q1).
4. ***Lagziel**^{PI} D. and E. Lehrer^{PI}. 2019. A Bias of Screening. *American Economic Review: Insights*. 3:343-356.
Citations: 1 (ISI), 3 (GS);
JR: -; Q; (NEW journal).
5. ***Lagziel**^{PI} D. and E. Lehrer^{PI}. 2021. Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism, *Economic Theory*. 71: 483–504.
Citations: 0 (ISI), 0 (GS);
AIS: 1.029; 106/373; Economics (Q2).
6. *E. Einy^{PI} and O. Haimanko^{PI}, and **Lagziel**^{PI} D. 2022. Strong Robustness to Incomplete Information and the Uniqueness of a Correlated Equilibrium. *Economic Theory*. 73:91–119
Citations: 0 (ISI), 1 (GS);
AIS: 1.029; 106/373; Economics (Q2).
7. ***Lagziel**^{PI} D. and E. Lehrer^{PI}. 2022. Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals. *Forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*.
Citations: 0 (ISI), 1 (GS);
AIS: 3.13; 32/373; Economics (Q1).

(e) Published scientific reports and technical papers(f) Unrefereed professional articles and publications(g) Classified articles and reports

• **Lectures and Presentations at Meetings and Invited Seminars**

(a) Invited plenary lectures at conferences/meetings

(b) Presentation of papers at conferences/meetings (oral or poster)

1. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2012, Approachability with delayed information, The 4th Israeli Game Theory Conference, TAU.
2. **Lagziel** D., 2015, Credit Auctions and Bid caps, The 7th Israeli Game Theory Conf., TAU.
3. **Lagziel** D., 2015, Credit Auctions and Bid caps, Conference in Honor of Abraham Neyman, Hebrew University.
4. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2016, Reward Schemes, Games 2016, Maastricht University.
5. **Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2017, Reward Schemes, The 9th Israeli Game Theory Conference, Technion.
6. ***Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2018, Performance Cycles, The 10th Israeli Game Theory Conference, IDC.
7. ***Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2018, Performance Cycles, The 29th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook University.
8. ***Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2018, A Bias of Screening, ORSIS 2018, BGU.
9. ***Lagziel** D. and E. Lehrer, 2019, A Comparison of Noisy Signals in Screening, ORSIS 2019, Shfayim.

(c) Presentations at informal international seminars and workshops

(d) Seminar presentations at universities and institutions

1. 2012, Mathematics, TAU, Approachability with delayed information.
2. 2014, Mathematics, TAU, Credit auctions and bid caps.
3. 2015, Mathematics, TAU, Reward Schemes.
4. 2015, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Credit auctions and bid caps.
5. 2015, Business School, TAU, Reward Schemes.
6. 2016, Mathematics, TAU, Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism.
7. 2016, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Reward Schemes.
8. 2016, Economics, TAU, Reward Schemes.
9. 2016, Economics, Hebrew University, Reward Schemes.
10. 2016, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Reward Schemes.
11. 2016, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Reward Schemes.
12. 2017, Economics, BGU, Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism.
13. 2017, Economics, Haifa, Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism.
14. *2018, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, A Case for Pay Secrecy.
15. *2018, Economics, TAU, A Case for Pay Secrecy.
16. *2018, Mathematics, TAU, A Bias of Screening.
17. *2018, Economics, BGU, Restraining Labor-Market Competition Through Wage Secrecy.
18. *2019, Economics, Manchester University, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
19. *2019, Business school, Glasgow University, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
20. *2019, Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
21. *2019, Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
22. *2019, Mathematics, TAU, Strong Robustness to Incomplete Information and the Uniqueness of a Correlated Equilibrium.
23. *2021, Economics, Aix-Marseille, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.
24. *2021, One World Mathematical Game Theory Seminar, Screening: Optimal Methods and Anomalies.

- **Patents**

- **Research Grants:**

1. *2019-2021, ISF, Blumkin^{PI} T. and D. Lagziel^{PI}, Wage Secrecy in Labor Contracts, 32,000\$ per year, 64,000\$ total.

- **Present Academic Activities**

- Research in progress

1. *Statistical stigma and disinformation in social network, joint with T. Blumkin, to be completed by March 2021.
2. *Sequential Screening, joint with E. Lehrer, to be completed by March 2021.
3. *The Rise of Manipulation in Stiff Competitions, joint with E. Lehrer, to be completed by March 2021.

- Books and articles to be published

1. *Asymmetric Multiple-Prize All-Pay Auctions with Complete Information, joint with A. Sela and C. Cohen, submitted to Games and Economic Behavior.
2. *The Strategic Role of Pay Secrecy in Labor Markets with Matching Frictions, joint with T. Blumkin. Submitted to the Journal of Economic Theory.
3. *A Case for Pay Secrecy, joint with T. Blumkin. submitted to Games and Economic Behavior.

- **Additional Information**

- **Synopsis of research, including reference to publications and grants in above lists**

I am currently pursuing two main research agendas: (i) screening problems; and (ii) wage secrecy.

The screening-problems agenda (joint with E. Lehrer) originally started with my Ph.D. thesis. In my thesis, I focused on a game-theory approach to financial problems [see papers entitled: *Reward Schemes* (GEB 2018), *Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism*, and *Performance Cycles*]. These papers lead us to the problem of screening portfolio managers and we decided to take a broader perspective on the general problem of screening under uncertainty. The first paper in this agenda is entitled *A bias of Screening* (AER: Insights, 2019), the second paper is *A Noisy Comparison of Signals in Screening*, and we are now working on the third entitled *Sequential Screening*. I plan to continue this line of research for at least three more years and additional 3 more research papers.

My second research agenda (joint with T. Blumkin) is in Labor Economics and deals with wage secrecy in labor contracts. We have written two research papers, entitled: (1) *The Strategic Role of Pay Secrecy in Labor Markets with Matching Frictions*; and (2) *Restraining Labor-Market Competition Through Wage Secrecy*. In addition, we received a two-year ISF research grant. We aim to continue this agenda for at least 3 more years and 3 more research papers.

Other than the mentioned studies, I have an interest in Mechanism Design. My first paper in this field is entitled *Credit auctions and bid caps* (GEB 2019). In addition, I am working on two more papers: (1) *Asymmetric Multiple-Prize All-Pay Auctions with Complete Information* (joint with Sela A. and C. Cohen); and (2) *Spiteful Auctions* (joint with E. Solan). This topic is more of a side issue for me, but I plan to continue researching this field, as well.

- **Teaching Statement**

My teaching philosophy is very constructive and mainly derived from my research one. I first divide the material into key elements, and focus on every individual part to the point where the students absorb the required intuition. Once this goal is reached, I try to give simple, yet relevant, examples to guide the student and generalize the studied notions. For me, a good example is an example that links a well-known idea with a novel one.

Throughout the years that I have been teaching at Tel Aviv University, The IDC and BGU, I realized that the right phrasing is of high importance to the students' learning.

Therefore, I try to explain difficult ideas in several ways, and follow-through the more fitting ones. In addition, I believe in a direct relation with students and encourage my students to ask questions in class and attend office hours regularly to enhance the learning process.