

Research Synopsis

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I am an Associate Professor of Economics at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. My research lies at the intersection of game theory, information economics, and political economy, with a particular focus on the design of strategic environments under informational frictions. Over the past few years, my research agenda has evolved along three interrelated lines: screening and statistical decision-making, contest theory, and the study of public debate and polarization in political economy.

Screening and Statistical Decision-Making

My first line of research focuses on screening environments—settings where a decision maker selects elements from a population based on noisy information. I am particularly interested in identifying non-monotonic features of screening processes, even when signals are completely unbiased, and in designing mechanisms that improve the quality of selection.

In *A Bias of Screening* (AER: Insights, 2019), we show that stricter screening thresholds may paradoxically reduce the average quality of selected elements. This occurs because unbiased noise interacts with screening thresholds in a way that distorts the selection process. Building on this, in *Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism* (Economic Theory, 2021), we propose a novel market design solution where transferable deposits are used to mitigate screening failures in portfolio management settings. In *Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals* (AEJ: Microeconomics, 2022), we develop a framework for comparing noisy signals in screening problems. We show that adding independent noise—effectively introducing a “lucky coin toss”—can improve screening outcomes under threshold strategies.

Our recent work, *Dynamic Screening* (R&R in Economic Modelling), studies multi-stage screening processes where elements are repeatedly evaluated. We show that introducing an additional screening stage may deteriorate selection quality unless the screening is applied

extensively across many stages.

This research agenda naturally led us to explore environments in which decision makers interact with AI advisors. In *Working with AI: An Analysis for Rational Integration* (R&R in Games and Economic Behavior), we develop a model of decision making in which both the human decision maker and the AI possess informative private signals. We show that the correctness of the decision process is not monotonic in the participants' expertise levels: a less accurate AI or a less accurate decision maker may, counterintuitively, lead to improved decision-making.

Contest Theory and Strategic Behavior

Another line of my research focuses on contest theory—the study of competitive environments where agents exert costly efforts to win prizes.

In *Strong Robustness to Incomplete Information and the Uniqueness of a Correlated Equilibrium* (Economic Theory, 2022), we provide new foundations for robustness in games with incomplete information, establishing conditions for the uniqueness of correlated equilibria.

In *The Role of the Second Prize in All-Pay Auctions with Two Heterogeneous Prizes* (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2023), we analyze all-pay auctions where the prizes differ in value and are valued asymmetrically by the contestants. We show that the structure of prizes affects bidding behavior and expected payoffs in non-trivial ways.

In addition, we have studied the design of reward schemes in portfolio management. In *Reward Schemes* (Games and Economic Behavior, 2018), we show that optimal reward schemes can be constructed to align managers' incentives with investors' objectives, even in competitive environments where fund flows are determined by relative performance.

Political Economy, Public Debate, and Polarization

Building on my work in contest theory, I have extended these tools with colleagues to study public debate, political sabotage, and polarization in the realm of political economy.

In *Resource Windfalls and Political Sabotage* (American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2025), we provide empirical evidence that resource windfalls significantly increase negative campaigning in U.S. gubernatorial elections. Using over 5 million political ads, we show that higher resource windfalls lead to a substantial rise in campaign negativity, driven primarily by corruption and intensified in symmetric electoral environments.

In *Resource Windfalls, Connectivity, and Political Polarization* (Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2025), we develop a model of public debate in which resource

windfalls spark contests over public opinion. We show that in highly connected societies—where political engagement is intense—resource windfalls lead to elevated polarization by enabling extremists to dominate the discourse. This research builds on the original framework for which I received a 4-year ISF grant.

More recently, in *Political Rational Inattention: A New Measure With an Application to Political Polarization* (2025), we propose a new measure of rational inattention in political environments. We show how voters' limited attention, combined with strategic communication by candidates, shapes patterns of polarization.

Finally, in *Do Campaign Contributions Fuel Political Sabotage?* (2025, under review), we examine how campaign financing affects the incentives for political sabotage. We show that contributions increase the stakes of political contests, leading to higher levels of negative campaigning.

Research Outlook

Looking ahead, my research will continue to develop these three interrelated lines, with an emphasis on information frictions in Bayesian game (*Comparison of Oracles*, with Ehud Lehrer and Tao Wang) and on polarization and sabotage (with Ohad Raveh). I am particularly interested in the emerging challenges posed by the governance of public discourse, and the design of strategic environments under informational frictions.